







Semantic Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and 
Slow Switching
Abstract
Semantic	externalism holds that the content of at least some of our thoughts is partly con-
stituted by external factors. Accordingly, it leads to the unintuitive consequence that we 
must then often be mistaken in what we are thinking, and any kind of claim of privileged 
access must be given up. Those who deny that semantic externalists can retain any ac-
count of self-knowledge are ‘incompatibilists’, while those who defend the compatibility 
of self-knowledge with semantic externalism are ‘compatibilists’. This paper examines the 
claim of compatibilism, focusing on Burge’s “Slow Switching Argument” and Boghossian’s 
“Objection of Relevant Alternatives”. I argue that compatibilism is false, and that semantic 





It	 is	 relatively	uncontroversial	 that	we	have	 a	 kind	of	 privileged	 access	 to	








of	 semantic	externalism	are	 then	charged	with	 the	unintuitive	consequence	
that	we	must	often	be	mistaken	 in	what	we	are	 thinking.	Furthermore,	any	
kind	of	claim	to	privileged	access	must	be	given	up.	For,	if	mental	states	are	
constituted	 in	part	by	 the	external	 environment,	 so	 that	 if	 the	environment	
changes	so	does	my	 thought,	 then	how	could	 I	possibly	have	any	claim	to	




Gilbert	 Ryle	 (The Concept of Mind,	 Hutch-

















1. Self-Knowledge and Semantic Externalism
Before	 turning	 to	 the	compatibilist	 issue,	 some	prefatory	 remarks	are	 in	
order.	First,	it	is	important	to	call	attention	to	the	central	claims	associated	





edge	 is	 taken	as	a	paradigmatic	case	of	a	second-order	 intentional	state.	












(6)	 The	 justification	 for	 self-knowledge	 is	 attained	either	 through	 the	 sub-

































reflexively,	 it	 is	 an	 object	 of	 reference	 and	
knowledge,	 but	 simultaneously	 a	 constitu-
ent	of	one’s	point	of	view.	The	essential	role	




most	 knowledge,	 the	 justification	 of	 which	
does	not	depend	on	 the	 first-person	point	of	
view	in	 the	same	way.	The	 tendency	 to	blur	
distinctions	between	a priori	 knowledge	 (or	
equally,	knowledge	involved	in	explication	of	
one’s	 concept)	 and	 authoritative	 self-knowl-
edge	is,	I	think,	an	instance	of	Descartes’	cen-
tral	 mistake:	 Exaggerating	 the	 implications	
of	 authoritative	 self-knowledge	 for	 imper-
sonal	knowledge	of	necessary	truths”	(Burge,	
Tyler,	 “Individualism	 and	 Self-Knowledge”,	
The Journal of Philosophy	 85	 (1988),	 pp.	
649–663,	here	p.	662).
4
Paul	Boghossian	 argues	 that	 self-knowledge	
is	direct	and	without	 inference	(Boghossian,	
Paul	 A.,	 “Content	 and	 Self-Knowledge”,	
Philosophical Topics	 17	 (1989),	 pp.	 5–26).	
Yet,	 James	 Chase	 argues	 that	 some	 self-
knowledge	 is	 inferential	 (Chase,	 James,	 “Is	
Externalism	about	Content	Inconsistent	with	
Internalism	 about	 Justification?”,	 Australa-





cess	 to	 her	 thoughts,”	 and	 so,	 introspection	
is	 intricately	 linked	 to	 self-knowledge	 (S.	
Sawyer,	 “An	 Externalist	 Account	 of	 Intro-
spective	Knowledge”,	 p.	 358).	 But,	 Charles	
Landesman,	 Jr.	 argues	 there	 is	 a	 difference	
between	 introspection	 and	 self-knowledge,	
where	 introspection	 is	 the	 “act	 of	 observing	
one’s	 mental	 states”	 while	 self-knowledge	
is	 “the	 achievement	of	 that	knowledge.”	He	
explains:	 “Few	 writings	 make	 the	 further	
distinction	 between	 the	 act	 of	 observing	 or	
attending	to	one’s	present	states	for	 the	pur-
pose	 of	 acquiring	 knowledge	 of	 them	 and	
the	actual	achieving	of	or	coming	to	possess	
such	 knowledge”	 (Landesman,	 Charles,	 Jr,	
“Consciousness”,	in:	Paul	Edwards	(ed.), The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume Two,	
Macmillan,	 New	York	 1967,	 pp.	 191–195).	




whereby	 a	 subject	 has	 privileged	 access	 to	
her	 thoughts:	 “Introspection,	 therefore,	 is	 a	




a	 more	 general	 ‘self-consciousness’	 which	
characterizes	 all	 or	 some	of	 our	mental	 his-
tory”	 (Dalmiya,	 Vrinda,	 “Introspection”,	 in	
Jonathan	Dancy	&	Ernest	Sosa	(eds.)	A Com-
panion to Epistemology,	 Blackwell,	 Oxford	
1992,	p.	218).
	 6
Not	 everyone	 agrees	 that	 the	 first-order	
thought	 is	 the	 “object”	 of	 the	 second-order	
thought,	 but	 will	 agree	 that	 the	 first-order	
thought	 provides	 the	 “content”	 for	 self-
knowledge.	In	other	words,	“the	thought	that	










be	 either	 a priori	 or	 non-inferential.	 There	
are	 cases	 of	 which	 self-knowledge	 may	 be	
neither	a priori	nor	non-inferential,	but	these	
cases	 can	 lay	 no	 claim	 to	 privileged	 access	
and	 thus,	will	 not	 be	 a	 concern	 of	 this	 par-
ticular	paper.	I	am	only	concerned	with	cases	





One	 could	 substitute	 for	 “reliable	 process”	




are	 ‘self-presenting’,	 ‘self-evident’,	 ‘indubi-
table’,	or	‘incorrigible’,	such	that	one’s	expe-
rience	directly	 justifies	 the	belief	 that	one	is	
having	that	experience.
10




I	 am	 assuming	 here	 that	 introspection	 (or	
















One	 can	 then	 use	 this	 semantic	 externalist	 characterization	 of	 belief-states	














On	Earth,	water	 is	H2O,	 and	on	Twin	Earth	water	 is	XYZ.	Only	Bill	may	
be	 correctly	 attributed	 the	belief	 that	 he	 is	 thinking	of	water	because	 ‘wa-
ter’	means	having	a	chemical	composition	of	H2O,	among	other	things	(and	
Phil	may	be	attributed	a	thought	of	‘twin-water’).	It	is	further	stipulated	that	
Bill	 and	Phil	 have	 the	 same	 internal	 happenings	 going-on.	However,	 even	
though	Bill	and	Phil	are	in	the	same	internal	narrow	psychological	state,	Bill	
and	Phil	have	different	beliefs.	Furthermore,	Bill	and	Phil	both	have	a	belief	






ond-order	beliefs	are	different	due	 to	varying	 first-order	beliefs.	Thus,	 two	






























Immediately,	 we	 can	 see	 how	 epistemic	 internalism	 poses	 a	 real	 threat	 to	













is	unclear	whether	 the	 inputs	 to	one’s	 intro-




outputted	 second-order	 introspected	 beliefs	
as	inferential	in	character.	
12
By	 ‘belief-state’	 I	 shall	mean	 an	 intentional	
state	 with	 intentional	 content.	 Other	 inten-
tional	 states	 such	 as	 desires,	 hopes,	 etc.	 are	
also	constituted	by	the	three	aforementioned	
components.	 Any	 of	 these	 states,	 includ-
ing	 belief-states,	 are	 ‘psychological	 states’.	




have	 called	 the	 agent’s	 ‘internal	 states’	 and	
are	 not	 proper	 psychological	 states.	 Internal	
states	 may	 be	 images,	 goings-on,	 or	 other	
things	 internal	 to	 the	agent	 that	do	not	have	
intentional	 content.	 Externalists	 claim	 that	










counts	 of	 self-knowledge,	 as	 long	 as	 some	
self-knowledge	 is	 only	 “narrow”	 in	 charac-
ter	and	does	not	 involve	any	wide	concepts.	
If	 this	were	 the	 case,	 then	 all	 factors	would	
be	 internally	 available	 to	 an	 agent	 because	
the	contents	 involved	would	all	be	narrowly	
individuated.	 Essentially,	 Chase	 is	 drawing	
attention	to	the	fact	that	not	all	semantic	ex-
ternalists	 need	 accept	 the	 anti-individuation	
thesis	 regarding	mental	 content,	 or	 at	 least,	
that	 some	 semantic	 externalists	 can	 main-
tain	 that	 some	 content	 (the	 mental	 content	
of	 self-knowledge)	 is	 narrowly	 individuated	
even	 though	 meaning	 is	 in	 some	 sense	 ex-
ternal.	And	of	course,	the	consistency	Chase	
attributes	between	 semantic	externalism	and	
epistemic	 internalism	 would	 also	 hold	 true	
between	semantic	externalism	and	epistemic	
externalism.	 Hence,	 if	 we	 accept	 the	 claim	














in	connection	with	Boghossian’s	Objection of Relevant Alternatives.	But	first,	
I	will	articulate	Burge’s	defense	of	compatibilism	in	the	context	of	his	‘Slow	
Switching	Argument’.14
2. Compatibilism and the Slow Switching Argument
Turning	now	directly	to	the	issue	of	compatibilism,	we	are	interested	in	an-
swering	 the	question	of	whether	semantic	externalism	precludes	 the	ability	
for	 one	 to	 have	 self-knowledge.	 Under	 semantic	 externalism,	 is	 there	 the	
same	kind	of	room	for	error	in	an	agent’s	second-order	introspective	belief	
that	occurs	at	the	first-order	belief	level?	That	is,	semantic	externalism	holds	





















right	and	fully	justified	as	ever.	The fact that the person does not know that a switch has occurred 









of	one’s	body.	One	might	call	 these	aspect	pure phenomenological feels.”16	
















knowledge	consists	 in	 thinking	one’s	 (first-order)	 thought	 self-ascriptively:	
“One	knows	one’s	thought	to	be	what	it	is	simply	by	thinking	it	while	exer-























sible:	 “The	 proposal	 is	 plausible	 only	 if	 it	 is	
assumed	 that	 [Bill]	would	 still	 be	 employing	
natural	kind	 terms	and	concepts	even	 though	



















onto	 the	world	 is	 that	 the	mind	 is	not	 essen-












objects	 of	 thought	 qua	 propositions)	 before	
the	 mind	 is	 deeply	 misconceived	 (Ibid.,	 p.	
660).	Donald	Davidson,	agrees:	“[W]e	should	
deny	 that	 there	are	objects	of	 the	mind.	The	
source	 of	 the	 trouble	 is	 the	 dogma	 that	 to	
have	a	thought	is	to	have	an	object	before	the	
mind”	 (Davidson,	Donald,	 “Knowing	One’s	
Own	Mind”,	Proceedings and Addresses of 
the American Philosophical Association	 60	
(1987),	pp.	441–458,	p.	455).
18




























































Under	Burge’s	 account,	 then,	 there	 is	 no	 room	 for	 a	 “mismatch”	 between	
the	content	of	the	first-order	thought	and	the	second-order	thought,	because	











An	 important	 consequence	 of	Burge’s	 deflationary	 account,	 then,	 is	 that	 a	














concentration,	 I	 need	 not	 be	mistaken	 to	 think	 that	 I	 think	 that	 it	 does.”27	





















P.	 Boghossian,	 “Content	 and	 Self-Knowl-
edge”,	p.	17.
25
Gallois,	Andre,	The World Without, The Mind 
Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority,	
Cambridge	UP,	Cambridge	1996,	p.	177.	
26
P.	 Boghossian,	 “Content	 and	 Self-Knowl-
edge”,	p.	21.	
27
















might	 be	 compatible	with	 semantic	 externalism,	 there	 are	 compelling	 rea-
sons	 for	 disregarding	Burge’s	 deflationary	 account	 as	 an	 account	 of	 genu-
ine	self-knowledge.	More	specifically,	Burge’s	account	requires	infallibility,	
such	 that,	 logically,	 there	 is	no	room	for	error,	and	 this	makes	 the	account	











Well,	one	puzzle	 immediately	emerges	 in	connection	with	 the	belief	com-
ponent	 of	 self-knowledge.	Namely,	 how	 is	 it	 that	we	 are	 to	 suppose	 that	






we	are	able	 to	attribute	 to	Bill	a	 that-clause	containing	“twin-water”	once	
Bill	has	been	 in	a	community	which	standardly	uses	 the	concept	of	water	
in	 this	deviant	way	 (or	once	Bill	 has	been	 appropriately	 causally	 situated	











instead,	about	 twin-water.	Bill	does	not	know	 that	 the	substance	 is	XYZ,	
nor	does	he	know	of	the	concept	of	twin-water.31	And,	if	Bill	has	no	belief	
about	twin-water,	then	he	cannot	be	said	to	have	self-knowledge	of	the	sort	








patibilist	 charge	against	 the	 semantic	externalist.	To	evaluate	 this	charge,	














Twin	Earth	–	 it	 is	only	 the	underlying	structure	of	 the	object	 that	changes.	
Nonetheless,	 by	 remaining	 long	 enough	 in	 each	 environment,	Bill	 has	 ac-
quired	both	Earth	and	Twin	Earth	concepts,	‘water’	and	‘twin-water’	(though	
Bill	is	unable	to	distinguish	the	concept	‘water’	from	‘twin-water’).	And,	once	
Bill	 has	 acquired	both	 concepts,	 twin-water	must	 be	 considered	 a	 relevant	
alternative.	Burge	wants	to	conclude	from	this	that	Bill	is	able	to	have	self-
knowledge	of	his	 thought	of	 twin-water	because	he	possesses	 the	 requisite	































Of	 course,	 Bill	 would	 not	 have	 the	 word	
‘twin-water’,	but	this	is	beside	the	issue.	The	
word	is	used	merely	as	a	heuristic	device	to	
make	 the	 two	 concepts	 distinct	 from	 each	
other,	 since	 both	 would,	 in	 some	 sense,	 be	
contained	in	the	word	‘water’.
32








Boghossian’s Objection of Relevant Alternatives is	a	straightforward	episte-
mological	argument:	in	order	to	be	justified	in	believing	something,	there	must	
be	no	 relevant	 alternatives	available	 that	would	defeat	 the	 justification.	Put	
another	way,	“a	person	is	said	to	know	that	p	just	in	case	he	distinguishes	or	












justification	 to	Henry’s	belief.	 In	sum,	“what	 the	presence	of	 the	facsimiles	
does	is	make	this	possibility	relevant;	or	it	makes	us	consider	it	relevant.”35




















disagrees.	He	defends	 the	 compatibility	of	 semantic	 externalism	with	 self-








(P2)	 S	cannot	 introspectively	discriminate	water	 thoughts	 from	 twin-water	
thoughts.



















As	Peter	Ludlow	argues,	 switching	cases	may	be	actual,	 and	 in	 fact,	com-
monplace.41	Thus,	Warfield	cannot	simply	rule	out	twin	concepts	as	relevant	
alternatives.	Warfield’s	 response	 is	 to	 claim	 that	 Ludlow’s	 argument	 only	





self-knowledge	 because	 of	 switching	 cases	 does	 not	 demonstrate	 the	 truth	
34
Goldman,	Alvin	I.,	“Discrimination	and	Per-











































































worlds,	 this	 undermines	 the	 justification	 of	 beliefs	 in	 the	 actual	world.	Or	















ism	and	 self-knowledge.	But	what	 about	Bill’s	 privileged	 access?	 In	 other	

















it	 is	 too	strong,	since	 logically	 there	is	no	room	for	error;	but	 it	 is	also	too	
weak,	 since	 it	 cannot	ensure	knowledge	of	 the	existence	 or	 type	 of	mental	


















Semantički	eksternalizam tvrdi da je sadržaj barem jednog dijela naših misli dijelom uspostav-
ljen na izvanjskim faktorima. Na temelju toga dolazi se do neintuitivne posljedice da naše misli 
često moraju biti zablude, i da moramo odbaciti bilo kakvu težnju za privilegiranim pristupom. 
Oni koji niječu da semantički eksternalisti mogu zadržati bilo kakav pojam samospoznaje su 
»inkompatibilisti«, a oni koji brane kompatibilnost samospoznaje sa semantičkim eksternaliz-
mom nazivaju se »kompatibilisti«. Ovaj rad ispituje kompatibilističke tvrdnje fokusirajući se 
na Burgeov »slow-switching argument« i Boghossianov »prigovor relevantnih alternativa«. 
Tvrdim da je kompatibilizam pogrešan, tj. da je semantički eksternalizam nekompatibilan sa 
samospoznajom.
Ključne	riječi
semantički	 eksternalizam,	 anti-individualizam,	 kompatibilizam,	 inkompatibilizam,	 slow switching,	
samospoznaja,	epistemologija,	filozofija	uma
Jennifer Wilson Mulnix
Semantischer Externalismus, Selbsterkenntnis und Slow Switching
Zusammenfassung
Der semantische	Externalismus behauptet, der Inhalt mindestens einiger unserer Gedanken sei 
partiell durch externe Faktoren konstituiert. Hiernach resultiert dies mit der unintuitiven Folge, 
dass wir uns des Öfteren in eigenen Überlegungen täuschen, und uns von jeglichem Anspruch 
auf einen privilegierten Zugang lossagen müssen. Jene, die bestreiten, die semantischen Exter-
nalisten könnten irgendein Bild von der Selbsterkenntnis behalten, sind „Inkompatibilisten“, 
während jene, die die Kompatibilität der Selbsterkenntnis mit dem semantischen Externalismus 
verteidigen, als „Kompatibilisten“ zu bezeichnen sind. Der Artikel prüft die Überzeugungen des 
Kompatibilismus, sich fokussierend auf Burges „Slow-Switching-Argument“ sowie Boghossi-
ans „Einwand der relevanten Alternativen“. Ich vertrete die Ansicht, der Kompatibilismus sei 





For	 instance,	 on	 a	 weak	 access	 internal-
ist	model,	when	Bill	 introspects	 that	 he	 has	
a	 thought	 of	 water,	 his	 internal	 state	 would	
defeasibly	 justify	 his	 belief	 and	 render	 it	 a	
case	 of	 self-knowledge,	 for	 the	 reason	 that	
Bill	 need	 only	 have	 potential	 access	 (which	
is	 itself	 not	 constitutive	 of	 the	 justification)	
to	the	conditions	that	constitute	his	justifica-
tion.	However,	under	a	stronger	acquaintance	
internalist	model,	 a	 subject’s	 non-inferential	
justification	 “is	 constituted	 by	 a	 direct	 rela-
tion	 that	 obtains	 between	 a	 belief	 and	 the	
fact that	makes	 true	 the	belief,”	and	so,	 this	
stronger	 view	 would	 remain	 incompatible	
with	semantic	externalism	(R.	Fumerton,	Me-
taepistemology and Skepticism,	p.	185).	The	
compatibility	 of	 semantic	 externalism	 with	












Externalisme sémantique, connaissance de soi et slow switching
Résumé
L’externalisme	sémantique affirme que le contenu d’au moins quelques-unes de nos pensées est 
en partie constitué par des facteurs externes. Par conséquent, il mène à la conséquence non-
intuitive que nous devons souvent nous tromper sur ce que nous pensons et que toute prétention 
à un accès privilégié doit être abandonnée. Ceux qui nient que les externalistes sémantiques 
puissent retenir une quelconque notion de connaissance de soi sont des “incompatibilistes”, 
tandis que ceux qui défendent la compatibilité de la connaissance de soi avec l’externalisme 
sémantique sont des “compatibilistes”. Cet article examine les affirmations du compatibili-
sme, en se focalisant sur le “slow	switching argument” de Burge et l’ “objection d’alternatives 
pertinentes” de Boghossian. J’affirme que le compatibilisme est erroné et que l’externalisme 
sémantique est incompatible avec la connaissance de soi.
Mots-clés
Externalisme	 sémantique,	 anti-individualisme,	 compatibilisme,	 incompatibilisme,	 slow switching,	
connaissance	de	soi,	épistémologie,	philosophie	de	l’esprit
